Veto Players in Post-Conflict DDR Programs: Evidence from Nepal and the DRC by Ansorg, Nadine & Strasheim, Julia
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Ansorg, Nadine and Strasheim, Julia  (2018) Veto Players in Post-Conflict DDR Programs: Evidence
from Nepal and the DRC.   Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding .    ISSN 1750-2977.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1501981





Veto Players in Post-Conflict DDR Programs:  











Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) 
programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research 
is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise 
factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game 
theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their inter-
nal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather 
than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR. 
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Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs have become essential compo-
nents of post-conflict peacebuilding. By collecting and disposing of weapons and ammunition 
from combatants, discharging ex-combatants from their respective armed groups and reintegrating 
them into civilian communities, DDR programs are widely regarded a core necessity to foster 
peace after war (Knight and Özerdem 2004; Muggah and O·Donnell 2015). 
 
Increasingly, scholarly research thus studies the causes and consequences of successful DDR pro-
grams. Four recurring themes dominate the debate. First, studies spell out a number of technical 
requirements for successful DDR, such as arms reduction (e.g. Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 
1996; Muggah 2005), sequencing, or creating economic opportunities for ex-combatants through 
education projects or small business loans (Banholzer 2014; Munive and Stepputat 2015). Second, 
studies discuss the vital role of international actors for DDR success, such as of the United Nations 
(UN) or international development and humanitarian organizations (Ball 1997). Third, studies ex-
amine the relationship between successful DDR and Security Sector Reform or SSR (Ball 1997; 
Mobekk 2009), noting that DDR is often an essential prior step to SSR that helps to increase trust 
between warring parties and creates a culture in which the use of weapons becomes unlikely (Mug-
gah 2005). Finally, studies increasingly focus on the role of gender identities (Colletta, Kostner, 
and Wiederhofer 1996; Kaufman and Williams 2015), emphasizing that DDR programs also fail 
as they ignore the special needs of female combatants (Jennings 2009). 
 
But despite the increasing attention in the literature, what works in post-conflict DDR and what 
GRHVQ·WLVRIWHQQRWYHU\FOHDUThis lack of systematic knowledge on what factors determine the 
variation in DDR success is also due to the fact that past research is dominated by under-theorized 
single case studies or policy-oriented best-practice guidelines. While studies offer fine-grained in-
sights into the dynamics of DDR in a few prominent cases, they are little integrated into the wider 
theoretical literature on post-conflict peacebuilding and lack the ability to detect the precise varia-
bles and causal mechanisms affecting the success of DDR (cf. Ansorg, Haass, and Strasheim 2013). 
 
To tackle this shortcoming, we examine the utility of veto player theory in identifying the condi-
tions that increase the likelihood of successful DDR implementation. The veto player theory is 
part of the wider field on game theory. It rests on a number of assumptions, which include the 
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following: veto players take rational decisions to increase their benefit; they are aware of the rules 
of the game and they have certain preferences over outcomes; veto players adopt one or more 
strategies to tackle the problem; outcomes are dependent on the preferences of actors and institu-
tions of a political system (Tsebelis 2002, 17ff.). The veto player theory can be adopted for a num-
ber of situations, including policy decisions on DDR after large-scale conflict.  
 
In this paper, we explore how (1) the number of veto players, (2) their distance, captured through 
the aspect of ethnic cleavages, and (3) their internal cohesion, captured through the degree of 
fractionalization and leadership continuity, affect DDR implementation. We thereby follow past 
research and consider such implementation to be successful if most or all of the anticipated num-
ber of weapons and ammunitions held by combatants are turned in and/or destroyed; most or all 
of the expected number of ex-combatants have participated in a demobilization program; and 
most or all of the expected number of ex-combatants are reintegrated into society (cf. Joshi, Quinn, 
and Regan 2015).  
 
We use the cases of DDR in Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to illustrate the 
mechanisms predicted by veto-player theory. Both cases offer fruitful empirical insights into key 
components of the veto player approach: Nepal saw a select number of veto players with similar 
policy goals and a moderate degree of fractionalization; while the DDR process in the DRC had 
to deal with a large number of distanced and fractionalized players. As selecting cases from distinct 
ZRUOGUHJLRQV´VWLOOFRQVWLWXWHVWKHH[FHSWLRQWRWKH UXOHµZKHQanalyzing policies in the Global 
South (Basedau and Köllner, 2007: 112), we expect that our results do not reflect factors that are 
specific to only one region, but represent a more generic explanation of success and failure of the 
implementation of DDR. Having said that, we explicitly stress that the different context conditions 
in the two cases do not allow us to employ an explicitly comparative methodological strategy. 
These distinct context conditions include, but are not limited to, the regional dynamics in the case 
of the DRC as opposed to the conflict in Nepal that was confined in its national borders; or the 
role natural resources played in the DRC without taking on a similar significance in Nepal. Instead 
of explicitly comparing the two cases, we rather use them to illustrate and highlight theoretical 
mechanisms derived from the veto player approach. The two cases provide a useful empirical 
background to test our theoretical assumptions and to reveal limitations of the theory, in particular 




ered through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. In total, 57 interviews and 
three focus group discussions were conducted during two rounds of field work in the fall of 2015 
and spring of 2017. Interviewees included current and previous members of government; high-
ranking officers in the Nepal Army (NA); former child soldiers, (female) combatants, and com-
manders of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN (M) rebels; as well as members of 
civil society and the international community. Focus groups were held with former combatants 
LQWHJUDWHGLQWRWKH1$DVZHOODV´UHJXODUµ1$VROGLHUVMost individuals spoke under the condi-
tion of anonymity, and about half of the discussions took place with the help of a translator. The 
case study additionally draws on existing research, policy reports, and news articles. 
 
For the case study on the DRC, we had to rely on primary and secondary sources, as field work 
originally planned for March 2017 was too dangerous to conduct, due to ongoing tensions follow-
ing the refusal of President Kabila to step down after his constitutionally mandated two-term limit 
expired in December 2016. We thus rely on program reports and evaluations by the World Bank 
and other actors, independent assessments by third actors, as well as single case studies and policy 
reports. We are aware that the information gathered through these sources is limited in comparison 
to fieldwork-generated data. However, as the Congolese DDR process is well assessed by donors 
and actors, we believe that this provides us with the necessary information to conduct our analysis.  
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section two, we elaborate on the theoretical 
assumptions of veto player theory in DDR programs. In section three, we briefly introduce the 
background to each case and DDR program, before providing empirical evidence on the causal 
mechanisms linking our independent and dependent variables. In sum, our findings suggest that 
while the number of veto players is a sound explanation for the (lack of) implementation of DDR 
in both cases, our results are more ambiguous when it comes to the policy distance and cohesion 
of players. Section four concludes by outlining avenues for future research.  
 
2. Veto Players and the Implementation of DDR Programs 
 
What explains the successful implementation of DDR? Tsebelis (e.g. 1995, 2002) offers a useful 
framework to study this puzzle by analyzing how different configurations of veto players affect 
the possibility of SROLF\FKDQJH+HGHILQHVYHWRSOD\HUVDV´individual or collective actors whose 
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DJUHHPHQWLVQHFHVVDU\IRUDFKDQJHRIWKHVWDWXVTXRµTsebelis, 2002: 19), and argues that every 
political system has a certain configuration of players that makes the departure from the status quo 
´policy changeµPRUHRUOHVVOLNHO\. Here, we define the successful implementation of DDR as 
such policy change or as movement away from the status quo that is the presence of fully armed 
and mobilized warring parties. Veto players are thus those actors who have the skills and ability to 
successfully veto the implementation of DDR. Following Tsebelis, we can formulate three hypoth-
eses about what configurations of players should affect the successful implementation of DDR.  
 
First, we expect a higher number of veto players to decrease the possibility of policy change: If 
decision-making over policy change is delegated to one player, the status quo follows her policy 
positions, but as the number of players required to agree to a movement away from the status quo 
increases, the ability for policy change decreases. Many actors can be veto players conflict-affected 
societies, and Cunnigham (2013, 38) defines veto players in such contexts DVJURXSV´WKDWKDYHWKH
ability to bloFNDQHQGWRZDUµHYHQLIRWKHUDFWRUVagree to implementing a peace deal. Such players 
include governments and rebel groups, as well as external states supporting these parties. Cunning-
ham (2013: 41) notes that not all rebel groups are automatically veto players, and that those that 
have more troops or better military equipment and training are more likely to be veto players.  
   
H1: The likelihood of successfully implementing post-conflict DDR programs decreases as 
the number of veto players increases.  
 
Second, following the veto player approach we expect that an increase of the policy distance of 
players required to change the status quo reduces the likelihood of policy change (Tsebelis, 1995: 
298): More diverse preferences of players shrink the size of the bargaining range and the chance 
of coming to terms on a deal all players find acceptable (Cunningham, 2006: 881). While veto 
player approaches in the political science literature often use ideological preferences of players on 
a left-right continuum to conceptualize the polarization of players, Cunningham (2006; 2013) sug-
gests to use a different measurement to capture polarization in conflict-affected societies. He ar-
gues that splinter rebel groups are unlikely to bring a diverse set of policy preferences to the table, 
meaning their position should be more congruent with other players in the game. Further ways of 
conceptualizing polarization suggested in the peace and conflict literature are ethnic cleavages 
(Svensson, 2009) and indivisible stakes in war (D. E. Cunningham 2011, 90).  
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H2: The likelihood of successfully implementing post-conflict DDR programs decreases as 
the policy distance between veto players increases.  
 
Third, following veto player theory we expect that the internal cohesion of collective veto players, 
GHILQHGDVWKH´VLPLODULW\RISROLF\SRVLWLRQµRIWKHFRQVWLWXHQWXQLWVRISOD\HUVTsebelis, 1995: 
301), affects policy change. According to Tsebelis, less cohesive players increase the possibility for 
incremental change as small deviations from the status quo may be approved by the majority. We 
expect that this assumption does not translate to highly volatile post-conflict situations. In fact, 
Cunningham (2006) proposes capturing player cohesiveness in such contexts by studying whether 
or not a party avoided fractionalization and leadership change during war. Following this strategy, 
we expect that if the claims of a cohesive party are met in peace negotiations, it will likely stop 
fighting and adhere to the terms of DDR negotiated in a peace deal. A centralized authority and 
lack of fractionalization can encourage a better implementation as parties execute orders along the 
lines of authority. Fractionalized parties might, however, continue fighting if one fraction feels 
under-represented or thinks it can get a better deal in future. Fractionalized parties may thus be 
less likely to implement change.  
 
H3: The likelihood of successfully implementing post-conflict DDR programs decreases as 
the cohesion within collective veto players decreases.  
 
4. Empirical Evidence from Nepal and the DRC 
 
Veto Players and Post-Conflict DDR in Nepal 
 
1HSDO·V´3HRSOH·V:DUµbroke out in February 1996, when Maoist insurgents began attacking po-
lice stations and government offices particularly in the Rolpa and Rukum districts in Western Ne-
pal. Promising to fight against widespread poverty and the discrimination of minorities as well as 
to fundamentally transform the government system of the country, the Maoists particularly mobi-
OL]HGPHPEHUVRI1HSDO·VPDUJLQDOL]HGFRPPXQLWLHVLQWRWKHLUUDQNV$PRQJWKHPZHUHZRPHQ
members of the lower Hindu castes, and minorities, such as Madhesis from the southern Terai 
plains (Kantha 2011; Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004). What began as a low intensity conflict as 
the Maoists were initially only fighting the Nepal Police (NP), escalated into a conflict with a much 
higher number in annual battle-related deaths from 2001 onwards. In response to attacks on the 
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51$E\WKH0DRLVWV·DUPHGZLQJWKH3HRSOH·V/LEHUDWLRQ$UP\3/$, the king mobilized the 
army in 2001, and the government additionally created the paramilitary Armed Police Force (APF) 
to defeat the insurgency. In November 2006, the Maoists and a coalition of seven political parties 
² but not the royal palace ² signed a peace agreement and agreed on several political and military 
reforms, including to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the combatants of the PLA. 
 
''5WKXVUHSUHVHQWHGDNH\FRPSRQHQWRI1HSDO·VSHDFHSURFHVV:LWKLQZHHNVIROORZLQJWKH
signing of the accord, Maoist combatants moved into seven cantonment sites and 21 smaller sat-
ellite camps that were set up throughout the country. The camps were established with the help of 
the small monitoring UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). In April 2007, UNMIN reported that all 
weapons were registered and stored in sealed containers monitored by its personnel, although by 
the terms of the peace accord the keys to these containers stayed with the on-site PLA command-
ers and were not completely detached from the combatants (United Nations 2007). Only in 2012, 
the Maoists allowed the NA to take over the control of its weapons, thereby completing the dis-
armament process in a more narrow understanding of the concept (P. Dahal 2012). Demobiliza-
tion and reintegration were equally protracted until 2012-2013. Among the issues that prolonged 
these phases were political disagreements between the Maoist leadership, the leaders of the political 
parties and the NA on mechanisms regarding the reintegration of child soldiers, the number of 
verified combatants, monetary compensation for ex-combatants, and on the mode of integrating 
Maoist ex-combatants into the NA (INT-02, 24.04.2017). In the end, more than 15,000 ex-com-
EDWDQWVFKRVHWKH´UHWLUHPHQWSDFNDJHµZhich entailed cash payments (Bogati 2015), while 1,400 
ex-combatants joined the ranks of the NA (Martin Chautari 2013; Subedi 2015). The cantonments 
closed in 2013. 
 
7RGD\PRVWREVHUYHUVUHJDUG1HSDO·V''5 process as one of the key accomplishments of the 
peace process and stress that the Maoists have successfully transformed from an armed group into 
a political party that has won ² and lost ² elections in the post-conflict period (Ishiyama and Batta 
2011).1 Can this be explained by the configuration of veto players? We defined veto players above 
                                                          
1 That being said, ex-combatants still face a number of challenges. A former child soldier, for instance, noted that 
many of his friends in the PLA remain poor and marginalized and are fighting a legal battle for compensation (INT-
03, 02.05.2017). A development worker pointed out that some ex-combatants have joined criminal networks; many 
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as those actors that possess the skills and ability to veto the implementation of a DDR program. 
Between 2007 and 2013, the period of implementing DDR in Nepal, the number of veto players 
was select. Because the royal palace dramatically lost its influence in the initial days of the transition 
in 2006-07, the number of veto players is effectively limited to (1) the Maoist rebels that later (and 
after the end of the DDR program) split into several factions (cf. below), (2) the government side 
to the conflict that itself consists of several political parties and coalitions, as well as (3) the NA.  
 
The number of veto players 
 
This select number of veto players helped the successful implementation of the DDR process in 
Nepal. The only rebel group that was to be subjected to DDR was the CPN (M). At the time of 
signing the CPA, this Maoist rebellion was approximately 30,000 fighters strong, although this 
number included about 3,000 child soldiers and 1,000 combatants that had been recruited after 
the signing of a ceasefire accord in mid-2006 (United Nations 2007). While the PLA chiefly fought 
with small arms, it had demonstrated that it could effectively control the countryside and bring 
significant parts of territory under its control (International Crisis Group 2005).  
 
The government, particularly the Nepali Congress (NC) party and (to a lesser extent) the United 
Marxist-Leninist (UML), controlled the NP and APF security agencies during the war and thus in 
total approximately 100,000 officers. The NA ² that had increased from 46,000 to 96,000 soldiers 
by the end of the war ² had traditionally been under de facto control of the royal palace (I. Adhikari 
2015). But even though it was brought under parliamentary control in 2006 and is an institution 
that abides by the decisions of the civilian leadership, it is regarded as a major player in the post-
conflict period with significant power to disrupt the peace process (Sotomayor 2014).2   
 
The palace itself, however, was sidelined in the early days of the peace process and could no longer 
represent a major threat to peace or the DDR process, hence losing its position of a veto player. 
On the one hand, this loss of power for the palace eased cooperation between other players (INT-
                                                          
have left Nepal in search for labor abroad (INT-04, 23.09.2015). Female ex-combatants still face substantive discrim-
ination for having transgressed what is regarded as adequate female behavior (Bogati 2015), and a civil society leader 
also noted that many former female combatants remain at risk for prostitution (INT-05, 02.05.2017). 
2 810,1GLGQRWKDYHVXEVWDQWLDOYHWRSRZHURYHU''5QRWOHDVWDVWKHPLVVLRQV·DXWKRULW\ZDVFRQVLVWHQWO\FKDO
lenged by the government that perceived it as biased in favour of the Maoist rebels.  
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17, 30.09.2015, INT-18, 06.10.2015). This is also highlighted by an ex-deputy commander of the 
PLA, who points out that DOOSDUWLHV´ZHUHLQDFRPPRQDJUHHPHQWDQG[...] RQWKHSHRSOH·VVLGH 
>ZKLOH«@ the monarchy >«ZDV@ the representative of some minor [...] feudal class. So if there 
had been a >«@ FRXSLWZRXOGQ·W KDYHEHHQVXFFHVVIXOµ,17-01, 26.09.2015). One the other hand, 
the sidelining of the palace and its inability to take on the role of a veto player was also the result 
of cooperation between the Maoists and the political parties. The former knew that they could not 
capture the state on their own, for instance as the political parties had significant support in the 
cities (Gobyn 2009). And the political parties ² fighting the increasingly authoritarian tendencies 
of the King ² realized the benefits of bringing the Maoists into their collective protests against the 
royal palace (Subedi and Bhattarai 2017). In sum, the small number of veto players in Nepal thus 
provides evidence for our first hypothesis, as it aided the cooperation between parties and the 
successful implementation of the DDR process. 
 
The distance between veto players 
 
Another important factor in the successful implementation of 1HSDO·VDDR process was the small 
distance between players. This becomes evident by two means. First, even though there existed an 
HWKQLFFRPSRQHQW WR1HSDO·VZDU² as the Maoists chiefly mobilized members of marginalized 
ethnic and social groups into their ranks (Gellner 2007) ² parties did not split along ethnic lines. 
Instead, all leaders of the Maoists, government parties, and security agencies belonged to the iden-
tity group that has always dominated the political system (von Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan 
2012). All were male, Nepali-speaking, high-FDVWH+LQGXVIURP1HSDO·VFHQWUDOKLOOUHJLRQ(WKQLF
or religious minorities, lower castes, women, or individuals from the northern Himalayas or the 
southern Terai region of Nepal were only represented in lower ranks of the parties or security 
agencies (I. Adhikari 2015). Many leaders of the different warring parties had therefore established 
close relationships before the war, also while studying at universities in India (Jha 2014). In inter-
views, a former government minister and NC member thus pointed out that lines of communica-
tion always remained open (INT-06, 19.10.2015).  
 
While this dominance of one identity group has contributed to a resurgence in minority politics 
and protests in recent years (Sijapati 2013), it aided the implementation of DDR because it trans-
lated into a small distance between veto players. This is because the belonging to similar identity 
groups eased communication, rebuilding of trust, and cooperation on an elite level, and especially 
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between PLA commanders and NA generals in the Special Committee for the Integration and Rehabilita-
tion of Maoist Combatants, one of the main bodies entrusted with the DDR process. Mediators in-
volved in the formal and informal negotiations regarding the DDR process and the Special Com-
mittee remembered that after initial hesitations, the warring party representatives started to trust 
each other more and more (INT-14, 03.05.2017). And former NA generals tended to point out 
WKH\IHOW´PRUHVLPLODUWKDQGLIIHUHQWµWRWKHLU0DRLVWFRXQWHUSDUWVDQGWKDWE\ZRUNLQJWRJHWKHU
in the Special Committee they became ´EURWKHUVµ,17-07, 27.09.2015, INT-08, 25.04.2017). 
 
Second, whDWDOVRKHOSHGWKHVXFFHVVIXOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI''5ZDVWKDWWKHSDUWLHV·SROLF\agen-
das with regard to the reintegration of ex-combatants were not opposed, again showing the small 
distance between players. At the leadership level, and due to the high degree of local ownership in 
the peace process, the parties could not point to the international community for any delays in 
implementing the DDR process. Instead, they were fully aware that voters would blame any fail-
ures in implementation on the parties themselves (Suhrke 2011). A civil society expert also noted 
that Maoist leaders also wanted to ensure their control over state institutions not only through the 
electoral process, but also by integrating as many of combatants as possible into the NA (INT-02, 
24.04.2017). Despite initial resistance ² arguing that the inclusion of politically indoctrinated com-
batants into the NA would pose a risk to the DUP\·VSURIHVVLRQDOLVP² this goal was supported by 
NA leaders (INT-08, 25.04.2017). In interviews, an academic and a security expert reasoned that 
the NA wanted to demonstrate its commitment to peace to the UN, for which it traditionally 
serves as one of the largest troop contributors (INT-05, 02.05.2017, INT-14, 03.05.2017). Prestige 
and reputation are further reasons cited by NA generals, who argue that as members of UN peace-
keeping forces they had themselves RYHUVHHQ''5SURJUDPVDEURDGDQGKDGIHOW´KXPLOLDWHGµLI
they could not have completed this process at home (INT-07, 27.09.2015).  
 
At the rank-and-file level, also Maoist combatants and NA soldiers were keen in bringing the DDR 
process to an end. Having spent their youth in war, ex-combatants hoped for a speedy realization 
of the DDR process as many of them wanted to get married and start families (INT-09, 10.10.2015, 
Martin Chautari 2013). Many ex-combatants also settled in urban areas as opposed to their often 
rural places of origin, as urban areas (and especially Kathmandu) offered improved access to jobs, 
education, and infrastructure (Bogati 2015). NA soldiers perceived that only a successful DDR 
process meant they could return to visit their families in villages that had been controlled by the 
PLA in war (FG-01, 28.04.2017). (YLGHQFHIURP1HSDO·V''5SURFHVVWKXVSURYLGHVVXSSRUWIRU
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our second hypothesis: the small distance between players due to (1) a lack of ethnicized relation-
ships and (2) a presence of similar policy interests contributed to the successful implementation of 
the DDR process.   
 
The fractionalization of veto players  
 
While the Maoist movement can be characterized as coherent and with a strong leadership under 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai at the start of the DDR process, it be-
came increasingly horizontally and vertically fractionalized over time. On the one hand, there is 
evidence that this increasing fractionalization even positively impacted DDR implementation, con-
trary to our theoretical expectations. Horizontally, the unified Maoist movement led by war-time 
leader Prachanda experienced several splits in the aftermath of the war. A first splinter group was 
formed towards the end of the DDR process in 2012 by Mohan Baidya (Kiran) and Ram Bahadur 
Thapa (Badal); other factions led by Netra Bikram Chand (Biplav) and Baburam Bhattarai broke 
away in 2014 and 2015 respectively. Vertically, the Maoist movement became also less cohesive in 
the post-conflict period, as the gap between leadership and combatants widened. Several observers 
account this disintegration to the level of corruption among elites. They remark that as soon as 
leaders joined the WUDQVLWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWWKH\XQGHUZHQWD´UHPDUNDEOHFKDQJHLQ«OLIHVW\OHµ
(M. Dahal 2008, 28) by using their new role in state institutions to prioritize their individual eco-
nomic benefits over the needs of combatants (A. Adhikari and Gautam 2014). One political op-
ponent and member of the NC noted that Maoist elites EHFDPH´ WKHULFKHVWSHRSOHµRI´ WKHULFKHVW
SDUW\ZLWKLQRQH\HDUµ,17-10, 12.10.2015). This alienated elites and combatants, as the latter felt 
betrayed by the leadership (INT-11, 22.09.2015, INT-12, 05.10.2015). In a widely circulated inter-
YLHZ 3UDFKDQGD·V ex-GULYHU ZDV TXRWHG ´7KH LGHDOV WKDW ZH KDYH IRXJKW IRU KDYH DOO EHHQ
ZDVWHG«7KLVLVQRWWKHFRPPXQLVWVSLULW7KLVLVZK\,GHFLGHGWRGLVDVVRFLDWHIURP3UDFKDQGDµ
(Nepali Times 2012). 
 
There is some evidence that this disintegration aided the implementation of the DDR process, and 
a former child soldier noted that the ex-FRPEDWDQW·V disillusionment with the leadership prevented 
any hypothetical return to arms (INT-03, 02.05.2017). One former 1$JHQHUDOKHOG´ 0DQ\SHRSOH
ask me if [ex-FRPEDWDQWV@ZLOOWDNHXSWKHLUZHDSRQVDJDLQ0\DQVZHULV>WKH\@ZLOOQRW«EHFDXVH
they were so badly used by their political leaders. They gave their lives, but they got nothing in 
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UHWXUQ:LOOWKH\DJDLQJRWRZDUWRPDNHVRPHERG\ULFKPDNHVRPHERG\3ULPH0LQLVWHU"1Rµ
(INT-13, 29.09.2015).  
 
On the other hand, it is difficult to establish a causal link, as the dynamics of the DDR process 
may have caused this increasing fractionalization in the first place. This becomes evident by look-
ing at concrete measures taking place in the demobilization camps. For instance, an aid worker 
remembered setting up radios in the camps to provide combatants waiting for their demobilization 
with leisure activities (INT-15, 12.11.2015). But, as a civil society leader pointed out, only after 
these radios were permitted, combatants became exposed to other political opinions than those of 
their own leaders, began to follow the political negotiations in Kathmandu, and started to become 
IUXVWUDWHGE\WKHOHDGHUVKLS·VEHKDYLRU,17-16, 19.10.2015). Evidence from Nepal thus does not 
provide support for our third hypothesis: a decreasing cohesion of veto players did not affect the 
successful implementation of DDR.  
 
 
Veto Players and Post-Conflict DDR in the DRC 
 
The DRC (former Zaire) suffered from extensive exploitation and destruction during colonial 
times, and in 1965 almost seamlessly transitioned into the authoritarian regime of one of the most 
FRUUXSWGLFWDWRUVRQWKH$IULFDQFRQWLQHQW0REXWX6HVH6HNR0REXWX·V=DLUHZDVDVDIHhaven 
IRUPDQ\UHEHOJURXSVVXFKDVWKH8JDQGDQ/RUG·V5HVLVWDQFH$UP\/5$DQGWKH$OOLHG'HP
ocratic Forces (ADF). Due to this undisturbed activity of countless rebel groups, insecurity grew 
in the whole Great Lakes region (cf. Prunier 2009). In 1994, the genocide in Rwanda heralded the 
fall of Mobutu. The influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Rwanda and growing inse-
curity led to the development and intervention of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL), supported by Rwandan, Ugandan, and Angolan troops who 
aimed to terminate the insecurity originating from Zaire. After a seven-month long war, the alliance 
overthrew Mobutu in May 1997 and Laurent-Desiré Kabila took power in his place. Kabila soon 
fell out with his former allies from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, and they supported rebel groups 
that fought against the new government, such as the RCD and MLC (cf. below)2Q.DELOD·VVLGH
his allies from SADC, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, intervened in the violent conflict. Sudan 
and Chad also intervened briefly on the side of Kabila, but they withdrew in 1999. Because of the 
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involvement of nine different countries and countless rebel groups the war between 1998 and 2002 
is also known as ´$IULFD·V:RUOG:DUµ (Prunier 2009).  
 
A withdrawal of foreign troops was agreed upon in the Lusaka agreement of 1999, yet it was not 
until 2002 that all foreign regular forces left the country. At the same time, many rebel groups 
from Uganda, Burundi, or Rwanda were (and partly are) still active in the DRC, competing against 
the countless Congolese rebel groups that were the source of insecurity particularly in the east of 
the country. The main aim of the DDR program was thus to reduce the number of armed groups 
in the country and to end the violence.  
Shortly after the Lusaka peace agreement in 1999, the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, renamed MONUSCO in 2010) was 
established with the aim to support peace-building measures in the country. At the official end of 
&RQJR·V6HFRQGZDULQDIter foreign troops had officially left the country, the World Bank 
started the biggest and most comprehensive DDR program in its history, the Multi-Country Demo-
bilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) (cf. World Bank 2010). It ran from 2002 to 2009 and 
included five national programs and ten special projects. In the DRC, the lead program was the 
Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion, PNDDR. At that time, the DRC had 
virtually no capacity in place for handling the program, and so the Commission Nationale de la Démo-
bilisation et Réinsertion (CONADER) was formed as a body to manage the DDR program (Scanteam 
2010, 75f.). By the end of 2008, a total of 102,014 of the Congolese ex-combatants were officially 
demobilized (against a target of 150,000) (World Bank 2010, 28f.), and demobilization continued 
throughout 2009. All of the 102,014 ex-combatants received reinsertion payments, and cell phone 
payments were used to compensate for the lack of a functioning banking system. Actual assistance 
for reintegration was provided to 54% of the demobilized combatants (ibid.). Those fighters who 
have not been demobilized continue to be active in the DRC, for example in the countless Mai-
Mai factions across the country.  
 
In general, since 2002 peace and stability have slightly improved in the DRC. However, it is doubt-
ful that this can be attributed to the PNDDR, but rather to a change in power dynamics in the 
country. The demobilization of the over 100,000 ex-combatants can be attributed to a successful 
political processes that led to the signing and subsequent implementation of peace agreements 
(Scanteam 2010, 119). However, after the end of the DDR program, violence was still ongoing 
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particularly in the eastern parts of the DRC, and countless armed groups as well as Congolese 
regular forces are still responsible for insecurity and instability in the country.  
 
During the DDR process, the DRC faced a high number of veto players from inside and outside 
the country. The main actor in the process was the Congolese government. After the killing of his 
father Laurent-Desiré Kabila in 2001, Joseph Kabila took over as president. During the peace 
process, he tried to co-opt some of the veto players into the government by giving them important 
positions and control over ministries. Particularly the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie 
(RCD) and the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC), the two major rebel groups fighting 
against the government between 1998 and 2003, were co-RSWHG LQWR.DELOD·VJRYHUQPHQW7KH
different fractions of RCD summed up to about 70,000 fighters, whereas the MLC counted about 
30,000 fighters (Allen 2011, 48). The armed elements of RCD and MLC were incorporated into 
the Congolese regular armed forces, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo 
(FARDC), and the elites received influential posts in the government.  
 
Another major veto player are the Congolese regular armed forces, or FARDC, summing up about 
100,000-200,000 soldiers by the official end of the war (Allen 2011, 48). While they were in theory 
controlled by the Congolese government, they became in fact more and more heterogonous during 
the peace process due to several waves of integration of different rebel groups. Particularly in the 
periphery of the country, they tend to have a life of their own, and are responsible for serious 
human rights violations (cf. HRW 2010).  
 
The Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI) was a rebel group that was mainly active in Ituri 
and was dominated by ethnic Lendus. There are no figures about the number of fighters of the 
FNI. It is said that they were supported by Rwanda and had close ties to AngloGold Ashanti, a 
corporate mining company that cooperated with the FNI on gold extraction (Allen 2011, 41). The 
FNI participated in several rounds of DDR, and the arrest of FNI leadership in February of 2008 
lead to a dissolution of the movement. Another Ituri-based rebel group and opponent of FNI was 
the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC). The UPC drew its fighters from the ethnic Hemas and it is 
said that the UPC was supported by Rwanda (Allen 2011, 42). The majority of its roughly 15,000 
fighters has been processed through the DDR program.  
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The Mai-Mai militias continue to be a major veto player across the DRC until today. A lose network 
RIFRPEDWDQWVILJKWLQJDJDLQVWWKHLQILOWUDWLRQRI&RQJRE\´IRUHLJQIRUFHVµWKH\XQGHUZHQWVLJ
nificant DDR measures. However, because they are so widespread and splintered, the militias con-
tinue to be active as of today. In 2004, the Mai-Mai militias were estimated at 30,000-50,000 fight-
ers (World Bank 2009, 2).  
 
Besides the more genuine Congolese armed groups there were also countless foreign groups active 
RQ&RQJR·VWHUULWRU\2QHRIWKHPDLQYHWRSOD\HUVLQWKH(DVWRIWKH'5&GXULQJWKHVZHUH
the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) with an estimated strength of 6,000-8,000 
fighters (Allen 2011, 43). They are the remnants of the Hutu militias that were responsible for the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and that had fled the country after the Rwandan Patriotic Front in-
tervened to protect the Tutsis. As they are not seen as Congolese armed group, they are not inte-
grated into the national DDR program. As a result of the ongoing violence against Tutsis and 
Rwanda by the FDLR, Laurent Nkunda, a former FARDC commander, established the Tutsi-led 
Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP). According to estimates by Congolese military au-
thorities in Goma, the CNDP consisted of about 8,000-8,500 fighters in 2007, although these 
estimates are disputed (HRW 2007, 21). It is said that the CNDP was largely backed by the Rwan-
dan government (HRW 2007, 4), but was active mostly in the East of the Congo. The activities of 
CNDP were brought to an end with the arrest of Laurent Nkunda by Rwandan forces in January 
of 2009. CNDP forces were reincorporated into the FARDC. 
 
During the 2000s, two Ugandan rebel groups were active in the Northeast of Congo: the Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF) and the /RUG·V5HVLVWDQFH$UP\ (LRA). There is no reliable information on 
the number of fighters for both groups (cf. Allen 2011, 51; Pehle and Speyer 2015). Both groups 
continue to be a source of insecurity and violence. The Burundian Conseil National Pour la Défense 
de la Démocratie²Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD²FDD) used to be active in the war 
from 1998-2003. With the signing of the peace agreement in Burundi in 2005 it became a major 
political party and retreated from Congo. Another Burundi rebel group fighting alongside the Con-
golese military against the Burundi army was the Forces nationales de libération (FNL). During the 




in Congo. For instance, even after they withdraw from the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda continued 
to support anti-Kabila rebel groups with weapons and funding.  
 
The number of veto players 
 
As becomes evident from the description in the previous section, the sheer number of veto players 
already posed a challenge to the successful implementation of the DDR program. While some of 
the Congolese armed groups such as RDC and MLC could be co-opted into the government or 
were in such a weak position to participate voluntarily in the DDR program, it was particularly 
those groups that had a regional link that prevented a successful implementation of the program. 
For instance, the FDLR was not integrated into any of the five national programs of the MDRP: 
the conflict with the government of Rwanda was ongoing throughout the 2000s. The Rwandan 
government refused to negotiate with those who committed the genocide in 1994 (Des Forges 
1999). And from Congolese side they were seen as Rwandan rebels that should not undergo a 
Congolese DDR program (Autesserre 2010).  
 
Another important veto player particularly after 2006 was the CNDP. Even though most of the 
fighters originated from Congo, they refused to demobilize. The CNDP saw their aim in fighting 
against the Rwandan rebels from the FDLR, and they continued to receive military support from 
the Rwandan government, which made them more likely to be veto players, according to veto 
player theory (D. Cunningham 2013, 38). Other foreign rebel groups were only slowly demobilized 
(such as the Burundian CNDD-FDD and FNL). The Ugandan LRA and ADF continue to be 
active in Northern Congo and the Central African Republic as of 2017 (Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program 2017).  
 
The number of veto players from within and outside of Congo provides empirical evidence for 
our first hypothesis: the high number of rebel groups who did not participate in the DDR program 
decreased the likelihood of successfully implementing the program.  
 
The distance between veto players 
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Another factor that might have influenced the implementation of the DDR process in Congo was 
the distance between the different veto players. While the different splinter groups, for instance of 
RDC and MLC, did not have very diverse policy preferences, it was particularly ethnic conflicts 
that lied at the heart of the polarization between the Congolese warring parties.  
 
This becomes evident particularly in the Tutsi-Hutu divide that has a destabilizing impact on the 
whole region until today. Again, the Hutu militias of the FDLR were not seen as genuine Congo-
lese, and thus they did not participate in the Congolese DDR program. However, they continued 
to be a source of insecurity not only for Rwanda, but for Eastern Congo as well. As a result, the 
largely Tutsi-led CNDP was founded and fought against the FDLR in the East of the Congo. 
Rwanda continued to support the CNDP, as they saw the FDLR as major threat to their own 
security, but also to members of the Rwandophone community in Congo (Autesserre 2006, 7). 
However, for Rwanda the continued activities of the FDLR were not the only reason to support 
anti-FDLR forces, but also a good excuse to engage in economic activities in the resource-rich 
East of Congo and the exploitation of valuable resources as well (Global Witness 2005; Autesserre 
2006: 8). AutesserrHDUJXHVWKDW´WKHFRPELQDWLRQRIWKHVHVHFXULW\SROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLF
interests led Rwanda to actively support several armed groups responsible for local violence in the 
HDVWHUQ&RQJRµ(Autesserre 2006, 8). And also national actors such as the RCD or Mai-Mai took 
ethnic tensions as an excuse for continued warfare (Autesserre 2006, 11).  
 
Hence, particularly in the Congolese setting the continued violence cannot be alone reduced to 
ethnic rivalries and the (ethnic) distance between veto players. While rebel groups usually recruit 
their combatants from specific ethnic background, the conflicts are often caused by competition 
over land and resources. As AutesserUHVWDWHV´ORFDODQWDJRQLVPVRYHUODQGDQGWUDGLWLRQDOSRZHU
OHGWRYLROHQFHµSDUWLFXODUO\LQWKHHDVWRIWKHFRXQWU\(Autesserre 2006, 3). This includes compe-
tition over land and resources, poverty, and a lack of a governing or controlling authority 
(Autesserre 2006, 13ff.; Stearns, Verweijen, and Baaz 2013, 30). Militia networks drove and were 
driven by the development of a war economy, which thrived on illegal taxation, smuggling, and 
racketeering (Stearns, Verweijen, and Baaz 2013, 21). While this economy allowed for the quick 
enrichment of some, millions of civilians depended on it for survival, leaving them little choice but 
to collaborate with armed groups. Further, over the course of the peace process, the increasing 
availability of many ex-combatants did exacerbate this situation: they were often not re-integrated 
into their communities or did not have any alternative means of gaining a livelihood (Stearns, 
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Verweijen, and Baaz 2013, 77). A re-mobilization was hence easier or the only feasible option for 
the former fighters to survive. 
 
Evidence from the Congolese DDR process does not fully support our second hypotheses that 
the likelihood of successfully implementing post-conflict DDR programs decreases as the policy 
distance between veto players increases.  
 
The fractionalization of veto players  
 
The last factor that played a decisive role in the implementation of the DDR program in Congo 
was the fractionalization of the Congolese veto players. The government, for instance, was due to 
the integration of different conflict parties highly fractionalized. Several actors in the government 
such as RCD and MLC opposed DDR of their military wings particularly in the first years until 
the election. The different parties wanted to keep their command and control structure until elec-
tions had been held (Scanteam 2010, 66f.). However, even after the elections and once the gov-
ernment was in place, the motivation towards DDR continued to be reluctant. As mentioned be-
fore, control over land and resources particularly in the periphery of the country was too lucrative 
for some armed groups to give up arms and participate in the DDR process. Further, as Stearns 
et al. (2013, 8) DUJXH´WKH LPSOLHG ORJLFRIWKLVSURFHVV³granting insurgents political power in 
order to quell their insurgencies³persists until today, creating incentives for elites to mobilize 
DUPHGJURXSVµ7KXVWKHFR-optation of former warring parties into the government or military 
provided further incentives for mobilization instead of ending the violence. 
 
Further, the FARDC, Congolese regular armed forces, were also highly fractionalized, which im-
peded the peace process and lead to a renewed outbreak of violence. By repeatedly integrating 
armed groups into the FARDC, the government has not only provided incentives for further in-
surrection, it has effectively sanctioned impunity (Stearns, Verweijen, and Baaz 2013, 9). As stated 
before, some of the brigades led a life of their own without clear command from Kinshasa, and 
committed serious human rights violations particularly in the east of the country (cf. HRW 2010). 
After the elections in 2006 the brigades of Laurent Nkunda broke away from the Congolese forces 
with the aim to protect the Congolese Tutsis from the violence of FDLR. The newly built CNDP 
did not only fight against the FDLR, but also against other forces of FARDC, and committed 
serious crimes against non-Tutsi civilians (HRW 2007).  
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Non-state armed actors were also highly fractionalized, which contributed to a failure of the DDR 
program. One example are the Mai-Mai militias, which are a lose and non-cohesive network of 
armed groups fighting against foreign groups in Congo (HIIK 2017, 70f.). They are spread across 
different regions of the Congo. The fractionalization of the Mai-Mai militias exacerbates their de-
mobilization; due to their widespread nature, more localized demobilization and reintegration pro-
grams would be necessary to address the different claims by different factions.  
 
Evidence from the Congolese DDR process thus supports our third hypotheses that the likelihood 
of successfully implementing post-conflict DDR programs decreases as the cohesion within col-
lective veto players decreases.  
 
In Table 1, we give an overview of the findings from both case studies.  
 





Under what conditions are DDR programs successfully implemented after intrastate conflict? Ev-
idence from Nepal and the DRC shows that veto players can play a major role in fostering or 
preventing a successful implementation of DDR. However, results are ambiguous concerning dif-
ferent aspects of the veto player theory.  
 
First, our findings show that the number of veto players is a sound explanation for the (lack of) 
implementation of DDR in both cases. In Nepal, the small number of veto players helped the 
successful implementation of DDR, as it was beneficial to WKH0DRLVWUHEHOV· integration into the 
post-conflict political system and favored cooperation between players in the DDR program. On 
the contrary, the high number of veto players from within and outside the country in Congo posed 
a particular challenge to the implementation of the DDR program. While donors tried to tackle 
the regional dimension of the conflict with a Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration 
Program, it was impossible to integrate all players and demobilize the high number of diverse 
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groups. Thus, our first hypothesis can be confirmed: The likelihood of successfully implementing 
post-conflict DDR programs decreases as the number of veto players increases.  
 
The findings in regard to our second hypothesis on the distance between veto players are not that 
straightforward. In Nepal, similar policy goals and a lack of ethnic adversary were key to the suc-
cessful implementation of the DDR program, as it benefited cooperation and trust-building. In 
Congo, the Tutsi-Hutu divide might be seen as the heart of the ongoing violence in the country. 
However, this is only part of the story: the root causes of conflict in Congo lie in the competition 
over land and resources, and are exacerbated by poverty and the lack of a governing authority. 
Hence, the ethnic component of the conflict is not sufficient to explain the failure of DDR, and 
we do not find sufficient evidence for our second hypothesis that the likelihood of successfully 
implementing DDR decreases as the policy distance between players increases.  
 
Third, evidence from Nepal indicates that a growing fractionalization of the rebel group towards 
the end of the DDR program even aided its successful implementation, as the alienation of rank-
and-file combatants and rebel leaders prevented a remobilization for violence. In Congo, on the 
other contrary, the strong fractionalization of all important players ² the government, the military, 
and the rebel groups ² impeded a successful implementation of the DDR process. 
 
These findings are highly relevant as they link scholarship on post-conflict DDR and peacebuilding 
with the theoretical assumptions of the veto player theory. We adapted the veto player approach 
to explore and reveal mechanisms and aspects that affect the implementation of DDR programs. 
The two case studies offer rich empirical insights into key components of the theoretical approach, 
including the number of veto players, their distance, as well as their internal cohesion. The case 
studies provided a hard test for the main assumptions of the theoretical approach by applying it to 
a challenging environment of a highly dynamic and volatile post-conflict countries (George and 
Bennett 2005, 23f.), and clarified some of the main mechanisms that are specific to the study of 
implementation of DDR programs in two post-conflict countries. We are thus able to gain novel 
and detailed insights on determinants of effective DDR programs and post-conflict peacebuilding. 
 
We also revealed two limitations of the veto player approach. First, Tsebelis developed the theory 
to analyze political behavior in stable political systems, but particularly the DRC shows that con-
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ditions are different in highly volatile post-conflict environments. Even as players agreed to par-
ticipate in DDR, the success of implementation was not always given. Due to the political and 
socioeconomic context, former combatants were often unable or unwilling to stick to peace, and 
took up arms again. This shows that a deal to disarm and demobilize is not sufficient if other 
political or socioeconomic challenges are not tackled simultaneously. Second, veto player theory 
also shows weaknesses when it comes to dynamic post-conflict environments and a change in the 
constitution of veto players. It may be assumed that in Nepal, a high fractionalization at the start 
of the peace processes would indeed have prevented a successful implementation of DDR, as too 
many fractions would perhaps have prevented a joint agreement. However, as we demonstrated 
above, the growing fractionalization of the rebel group towards the end of the DDR program in 
fact aided the implementation. Such diverging effects of the independent variable throughout time 
are hard to model and cannot be assessed as straightforward as assumed by the theory. 
These findings leave room for future research, for example on the impact and embeddedness of 
veto players in a particular political or socioeconomic that affect preferences of players and policy 
outcomes alike. In addition, future models can improve the theoretical conceptualization of be-
havior and preferences of veto players in highly dynamic and volatile political situations that are 
so often found in conflict and post-conflict environments.  
 
6. List of interviews and focus group discussions 
 
Interview INT-01, 26.09.2015, former deputy commander of the PLA 
Interview INT-02, 24.04.2017, civil society leader and security expert 
Interview INT-03, 02.05.2017, former child soldier of the PLA 
Interview INT-04, 23.09.2015, international development worker (1) 
Interview INT-05, 02.05.2017, civil society leader and academic 
Interview INT-06, 19.10.2015, former government minister and NC member (1) 
Interview INT-07, 27.09.2015, retired major general in the NA 
Interview INT-08, 25.04.2017, retired lieutenant general in the NA (1) 
Interview INT-09, 10.10.2015, former combatant of the PLA 
Interview INT-10, 12.10.2015, former government minister and NC member (2) 
Interview INT-11, 22.09.2015, member of the international community 
Interview INT-12, 05.10.2015, civil society leader (1) 
Interview INT-13, 29.09.2015, retired lieutenant general in the NA (2) 
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Interview INT-14, 03.05.2017, security sector reform expert 
Interview INT-15, 12.11.2015, international development worker (2) 
Interview INT-16, 19.10.2015, civil society leader (2) 
Interview INT-17, 30.09.2015, former government minister and CPN (M) leader (1) 
Interview INT-18, 06.10.2015, former government minister and CPN (M) leader (2) 
 
Focus group FG-01, 28.04.2017, soldiers of the NA 
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